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Abstract 
Handling Digital Brains proves that ethnography of the laboratory is still ca-
pable of making a significant contribution in the field of social studies on sci-
ence and technology. The reviewed work presents details of interactions be-
tween researchers, as well as between researchers and their material equip-
ment, which are key to explaining the methods of solving research problems 
when analyzing brain scans generated during fMRI experiments. Significant-
ly, the reconstructed multimodal embodied practices shed light not only on 
the process of scientific cognition, but also on a broader spectrum of human 
cognitive activities. The book constitutes a challenge of a kind to neurocogni-
tive  sciences.  As  the  author  shows,  cognitive  neuroscientists  utilizing  fMRI 
declare that they study the embodied mind; yet, in practice, they reduce the 
body to the brain, and cognition – to purely internal processes. Such a model 
of  cognition,  (tacitly)  assumed  by  experimental  neurocognitive  scientists, 
turns out to be insufficient when used reflexively in order to explain the way 
neuroscientists themselves solve problems. 
 Key words: ethnography of laboratory; fMRI; cognitive neuroscience; multi-
modal interactions; science and technology studies; embodiment. 
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The reviewed work constitutes a report from ethnographic studies conducted 
in contemporary neurocognitive science laboratories, in which human cogni-
tive functions are researched with the use of technologically advanced meth-
ods of neuroimaging. Alač began her observations in the summer of 2002 in 
a newly opened centre equipped with an fMRI scanner, located at the Univer-
sity California, San Diego. However, the book is not devoted to research prac-
tices connected with using fMRI as such. While the work explains the signifi-
cance of this kind of technology for the development of neuroscience and dis-
cusses the principle behind it and the course of the experiments, it predomi-
nantly focuses on what happens after the experiments are finished, when it is 
time to process the data, analyze the visualizations, and prepare drafts of aca-
demic articles
216. 
Alač does not hide the fact that her cognitive aims changed over the course of 
her research. When she initially entered the fMRI centre, she was planning to 
comprehend the organization behind the collective work of scientists repre-
senting various research fields. At the beginning, she focused on the scanner 
itself  (a  monumental,  technologically  advanced  and  expensive  device)  and 
what  was  going  on  around  it.  However,  during  her  observations  over  the 
space of two years she started to be interested less in the experimental ses-
sions, and more in what was going on in smaller workshops, in which the sci-
entists processed, analyzed and transformed the data generated in the course 
of the fMRI experiments. An experimental session lasts only a few hours, and 
handling  the  scanner  requires  only  a  handful  of  scientists;  however,  pro-
cessing and analyzing the obtained data may take months and engage a much 
larger research team. In other words, what happens after the experimental 
session turns out to be decidedly more important and more interesting, as the 
researchers – most frequently, together – sit in front of the computer screens 
and devote themselves to apparently mundane interactions that require the 
usage of a rich set of narrative and multimodal resources. From Alač’s point of 
view, the very room with the scanner is significant inasmuch as it plays a role 
in the process of training new adepts or in the very interpretation and pro-
cessing of the data (see Alač 2011: 49-65). 
 
                                                             
216. It ought to be remembered that during the last ten years neurocognitive science practices and 
methods may have undergone significant changes. For example, the development of such data-
driven methods as multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) enforces a change in research approach: 
if in the laboratories observed by Alač the researchers looked for regions, modules or paths with 
specific functions on the brain visualisations, the researchers using MVPA approach the functions 
fulfilled by  different regional areas agnostically, assuming only that no matter how the brain 
processes information, it does so in a consistent and cohesive manner (Norman et al. 2006). One 
should also keep in mind the progress in the very field of the research instruments, including the 
field of mobile appliances. AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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The work begins with a reconstruction of one of the many data interpretation 
sessions that the author witnessed (Alač 2011: 1-5). This short presentation 
already shows that interpreting brain scans does not consist solely in passive 
staring at them. In order to comprehend the visualized results, not only do the 
scientists  change  virtual  perspective  –  switching  between  various  kinds  of 
images of visualized brain, changing the colour spectrum utilized to mark the 
levels of stimulation in various areas of the brain – but also they transform 
the visualization itself, doing so in a similar manner to how they would han-
dle a material, plastic object, which can be cut into layers or flattened. One of 
the methods described consists in flattening a creased, three dimensional sur-
face of the visualized brain in order to be able to see simultaneously the sur-
face of sulci and gyri covering the organ on a two dimensional screen. The 
scientists do not limit themselves only to using software functions. They also 
utilize  other  available  resources  to  facilitate  sustaining  visual  attention  on 
significant elements, recognizing particular neural paths of information pro-
cessing or regions, or to retain awareness of spatial relations between ana-
lyzed areas
217. It turns out that it is not only the mouse cursor that can be 
helpful, but also a researcher’s gesturing hand (which allows one to focus vis-
ual attention),  or  a  piece  of  paper with a hand-drawn  scheme constituting 
a map of important areas (which allows one to divide the observed scan into 
important regions forming ‘a map’; see Alač 2011: 105-109), held next to the 
screen at the level of the researcher’s eyes. In the aforementioned situation, 
one researcher uses his hand in order to explain to the other researcher how 
the program functions are used to flatten the creased surface, transforming 
a three dimensional representation into a two dimensional one. 
Alač refers to many other research practices of this kind that she registered 
and analyzed in detail. It ought to be added that her analyses include not only 
the behaviours of individual researchers, but also of pairs of scientists work-
ing and discussing a brain visual displayed on a single screen. The author 
takes the position that such prosaic, and yet commonplace activities are indis-
pensible for comprehending the process of interpreting visualized scientific 
data. Within science and technology studies (STS), very much attention has 
been paid to inscriptions (Latour & Woolgar 1979; Latour 2009) and visualiza-
tions (see e.g. Henderson 1998; Lynch & Woolgar, eds. 1990) as basic tools for 
solving scientific problems; however, understanding how a record on paper or 
an image displayed on the screen take part in the process of problem solving 
requires taking into account how the researchers use their bodies, as well as 
senses different than sight. For example, in the third chapter the author de-
votes her attention to a modality that is generally overlooked by the STS re-
                                                             
217 Importantly, the scientists observed by the author focused not on the whole scans, but on (as 
they called them) regions of interest.  Accordingly, an important research ability lies in fast and 
accurate identification of a region of interest and sustaining attention upon it. Good old-fashioned ethnography of laboratory 
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searchers, that is sound
218: it turns out to be key while training young neuro-
scientists, who, in order to become competent fMRI users and data interpret-
ers, at the very beginning take part in the experiments as subjects
219. 
The  author  devotes  significant  attention  to  the  very  status  of  visualization 
with which the neuroscientists work. What is, then, a visualization generated 
as  a result  of fMRI  experiments for  the  neuroscientist  who  works  with  it? 
A partial answer lies in the title of the book: brain scans are not simply images 
or photographs that we look at, or windows that enable us to take a look at the 
organ hidden behind membranes, bones and skin; they are something plastic, 
susceptible to such transformations as flattening or cutting, something that 
one should handle as they would a physical object. Brain scans are not “mir-
ror” representations of the brains of the study subjects. The final version of 
the scan is shaped by a number of theoretical decisions taken during its pro-
cessing, which are far from obvious for the whole research community. For 
instance, the scientists have to manually “retouch” scans: transform a frag-
ment of the visual that they consider an artifact (see chapter six
220). It should 
be added that the scans printed in journals or displayed on screens are two 
dimensional, even though they represent a three dimensional, rich structure; 
this  is  why  the  journals  present  various  views  at  the  same  time,  between 
which the research can easily switch while interpreting data. Optical meta-
phors (a photograph, a mirror reflection) turn out to be deceiving also due to 
the simple reason that one scan captures changes spread over time (repre-
sented with the use of distributed colours), while certain details are shown in 
a distorted manner, inconsistent with brain anatomy (e.g. the “furrows” are 
smoothed).  Although  the  changes that a  scan  undergoes result  in  its  being 
increasingly less similar to the original, at the same time they facilitate draw-
ing conclusions by the scientists. 
In order to conceptualize the status of brain visual, Alač refers to the differen-
tiation of iconic signs into images, diagrams and metaphors, introduced by 
Charles Sanders Peirce. As Alač argues, it is easy to consider signs ordinary 
images, but it is much better to think of them as Peirce’s diagrams. In Peirce’s 
concept, a diagram has a much broader meaning than today; it consists not 
                                                             
218 One of the few STS texts on the subject of the significance of sound and hearing in research 
practice is Cyrus C. M. Mody’s “The Sounds of Science: Listening to Laboratory Practice” (Mody 
2005). 
219 Let us add that by participating in the fMRI experiments as their subjects, the students of neu-
roscience learn, among other things, how important and difficult to achieve it is for the body of 
the subject to remain immobile during the study. 
220 Alač describes also an interesting situation in which the research team, according to the sug-
gestion of reviewers, changed the threshold value over which neural activity marked with colors 
appeared on the scan: as a result, it was possible to clearly “bring out” the most important re-
gions, and many local, small regions of neuronal stimulation, which constituted a kind of visual 
“noise,” disappeared from the corrected scan (Alač 2011: 154-155). AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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only of elements fulfilling representational functions, but also of the rules of 
manipulating these elements (Alač 2011: 41). A distinguishing characteristic of 
a diagram is that it retains a certain structure, which the designation has. Af-
ter Peirce, Alač provides a map of a battlefield as an example of a diagram. 
Not only does the map visually resemble the represented area, but also it ena-
bles the strategist to perform certain manipulations. The strategist – no matter 
whether he knows the represented terrain or not – can stick pins into the map 
in order to mark the distribution of armed forces. The pins on the map remain 
in the same spatial relation with respect to one another as the forces in the 
field are – a certain geometrical structure is retained here. This fact facilitates 
cognitive embracing of the situation on the battlefield, creates conditions for 
foreseeing the development of incidents, and experimenting with represented 
relations. It is not difficult to imagine other iconic signs representing the bat-
tlefield that would not allow for such procedures. One such example might be 
pictures taken at any position on ground level – they would be only images, 
not diagrams. fMRI scans are diagrams in that they do not mirror the brain 
hidden in the skull as much as they represent it in such a format that, despite 
transformations,  certain significant  relations  between  areas  and  points  are 
retained. The scans allow also for procedures similar to those that a strategist 
can perform on a map. This is one of the reasons why Alač describes scans as 
fields of interaction. 
When discussing Handling Digital Brains, it is difficult not to refer to certain 
deficiencies of the book. The work contains a significant number of repeti-
tions: certain statements recur in various chapters. While reading, one may 
have the impression that the book could be more “condensed”: in the present 
form the work counts fewer than 200 pages, including the index, illustrations 
and  transcripts.  With  better  editing,  it  would  be  possible  to  find  place  for 
a larger number of suggestive examples in the work without increasing its 
size: other than provide a general discussion of laboratory practices, the au-
thor limits herself to in-depth analysis of only a few transcripts, which, to-
gether, amount to – as it seems – up to thirty minutes of interactions.   
Another surprising feature of the book is the lack of references to embodi-
ment and embodied cognition literature , which constitute a significant con-
text  for  the  author’s  considerations.  The  references  section  contains  only 
a few contemporary overviews other than classic phenomenological works. It 
would have been good if the author had referred to a wider set of works, as 
she might have been able to find there some concepts that would have aided 
her  in  explaining  cognitive  functions  of  the  procedures  that  the  described 
scientists follow in their work. However, I assume that the author decided, 
following the example of ethnomethodologists, that a good description is the 
best explanation for the observed phenomena. Good old-fashioned ethnography of laboratory 
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Since we have pointed out some shortcomings of the book, we can move on to 
the most important issues, that is the question how Handling Digital Brains 
should be read and why the book is worth reading at all. 
Handling Digital Brains can be deemed an example of good old-fashioned eth-
nography of laboratory. In Poland, social studies of science or the anthropolo-
gy  of  science  are  usually  associated  with  time-consuming, meticulous  field 
research, whose aim is to reconstruct or explain scientific practices. Thanks to 
the overviews that have been published in Poland, STS is automatically asso-
ciated with reports from “classic” ethnographic research, carried out in labor-
atories by Karin Knorr Cetina (1981), Michael Lynch (1985), or Bruno Latour 
(Latour & Woolgar 1979)
221. The aforementioned pioneer research has opened 
the way for further studies over science. Among contemporary ethnographic 
studies one can mention such texts as Doing 2009, Merz & Knorr-Cetina 1997, 
Mody 2001, Myers 2008, Roth 2005, Roth & Bowen 1999, 2001, Sims 2005, as 
well as Alač’s own work. However, as Alač notes, the sense of the productivity 
of such research and excitation connected therewith have significantly weak-
ened in the STS research community. It does not seem to be the trend typical 
only for the last years. It was already twenty years ago that such an attitude 
was described by Michael Lynch: 
Rather than undertake the difficult, time-consuming, and epistemolog-
ically suspects tasks of ethnography, many sociologists of science have 
preferred to take refuge in offices and libraries. There they can act as 
if they are observing “science in action” while engaging in more re-
spectable  academic  pursuits:  sifting  through  historical  archives  and 
secondary sources, composing scholarly syntheses of the diverse liter-
atures in the sociology of science and related areas, and performing 
close textual analyses (Lynch 1993: 105) 
This conclusion may seem surprising from the perspective of Polish science 
studies. However, we mostly encounter STS by the means of research results 
published  in  journals and  presented during  international conferences (and 
from such a standpoint ethnography may still appear as a lively research ap-
proach), and what Alač (and, earlier, Lynch) writes pertains to the organiza-
tion of work and optimal paths of research career within STS, which a review 
of literature would not reveal. 
It seems that at present there are no additional institutional incentives for 
researchers who engage into ethnography, while those doing field research 
are  convinced  that  it  is  very  difficult  to  write  anything  meaningful  after 
                                                             
221 Although the publication dates of these works were separated in time, in fact the three afore-
mentioned books resulted from research carried out in similar time, in the late 1970s. Michael 
Lynch,  whose  book  was  released  last,  actually  started  anthropological  research  in  laboratory 
a few months before Latour (see Latour 1986: 541). AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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Latour, Lynch and Knorr-Cetina. In such a situation, the appeal of other, less 
expensive (in terms of time or data generating effort) strategies of career de-
velopment grows. One can go even further and risk a statement that a retreat 
from ethnographic research is a result of the general conviction that field re-
search has fulfilled its historic role. If we take a look at Latour’s field studies 
(including that at Boa Vista – Latour 1999: 24-79), it can be seen that it was 
subordinated to the achievement of certain philosophical goals, rather than 
strictly  empirical  ones.  When  entering  a  neuroendocrinology  laboratory, 
Latour wanted to aid a certain philosophical approach, and he used the eth-
nographic  materials  from  Boa  Vista  to  reconceptualize  an  epistemological 
relation (and, again, make a contribution to epistemology rather than to an-
thropology or sociology). It is difficult to treat Lynch’s Art and Artifact in La-
boratory Science as a voice in a philosophical debate (Lynch 1985; see also 
Latour 1986), but Knorr-Cetina in her Epistemic Cultures (Knorr-Cetina 1999) 
does not hide such aspirations: although the publication can defend itself as 
an excellent empirical work, the Austrian researcher for a certain reason has 
made the criticism of philosophical thesis regarding the unity of science the 
core of her argument. Perhaps in the opinion of a large part of the STS com-
munity field research made sense as long as it provided arguments in the de-
bate with the philosophy of science; however, now the debate is over, and 
thus ethnography may appear to many as useless. Perhaps it is only the en-
thnomethodologists represented by Lynch that did not allow themselves to be 
involved in the debates with philosophers; on the other hand, they did not 
declare that they were in a particular way interested in science as a particular 
subject of research. 
Let us, however, go back to Handling Digital Brains. When describing  Alač’s 
work as good, old-fashioned ethnography, it should be kept in mind that the 
book is free from the burden of philosophical ambitions in the sense that it 
does not enter into epistemological debates. The work can be read in (at least) 
three ways. 
The first, weakest reading consists in that Alač offers us another case study 
about  science,  thus  paying  “entrance  fee”  necessary  to  become  considered 
a  competent member of the STS community. Her book sends the message: 
I know the following body of works, I can design and conduct a study with the 
use of the tools I have mastered, finally, I can prepare a publishable report. In 
such a framing, the book should be considered simply decent, although I do 
not know if I would recommend it to people beyond a narrow group of spe-
cialists. Such a reading of Handling Digital Brains is, however, unauthorized 
for at least two reasons. The first is that Alač still conducts research such as 
that presented in the book
222, while the general tendency is for researchers 
                                                             
222 With what success, the readers may see for themselves, reading the text “When a robot is so-
cial” (Alač 2013), published in this issue of Avant. Good old-fashioned ethnography of laboratory 
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who have paid the “entrance fee” to abandon the toil of field research and 
devote themselves to activities more worthy of an academic, that is, analysis 
and synthesis of texts. Another reason is that in many places Alač points out 
how her work enriches the STS body of work. 
The second possible reading is that Handling Digital Brains constitutes an up-
date, or a supplementation of the existing studies on laboratory science. Alač’s 
work disperses doubts: the classics of the ethnography of laboratory did not 
describe all possible research disciplines. As has been mentioned, there are 
few works that would focus on the role of modalities other than visual for 
scientific practice. Similarly, there are few works that show the significance of 
the  embodiment  of  the  researchers for  the  problem  solving  process  in sci-
ence
223. It is worth to take Michael Lynch’s Art and Artifact in Laboratory Sci-
ence, that is the first of the classic, long term laboratory field studies, as a ref-
erence point that evidences the value of the book. Lynch also conducted ob-
servations in neurobiological laboratory, but the research practices described 
by him and Alač seem to be separated by centuries. In contrast to Alač, Lynch 
reconstructs works with representations from the age before personal com-
puters have become common in science. Moreover, Lynch describes typically 
two  dimensional  representations,  while  Alač  writes  about  representations 
that are partially three dimensional. It is worth noting that in a sense, Lynch 
reveals to the contemporary STS researchers practices that at present have 
been automatized with IT tools, and, thus, ”black boxed”. Significantly, in both 
Alač’s and Lynch’s accounts we can see the importance of situated, embodied 
research practices as meaningful factors in the process of solving scientific 
problems. Manual operations that we find in Handling Digital Brains which 
the  researchers perform when gesturing  in front  of  the  computer so  as  to 
highlight certain transformations of the visual, or, possibly, “superimposing” 
handwritten notes on the computer image, bring to mind the procedures uti-
lized by the researchers in the laboratory Lynch observed, when it was neces-
sary to prepare an electron photograph, repeat a difficult experiment or calcu-
late the ratio of certain neuronal surfaces shown in the picture
224. Both books 
demonstrate that no technique is too trivial or prosaic if it facilitates scientific 
problem solving. Interestingly, both Alač and Lynch write about visualizations 
that are prepared in such a way that they code certain changes spread over 
                                                             
223 Natasha Myers’ “Molecular Embodiments and the Body-work of Modeling in Protein Crystal-
lography” (Myers 2008) contains an interesting analysis that shows how scientists use their own 
bodies as a cognitive tool. 
224 The method referred to is termed paper doll in the laboratory (Lynch 1985). It consisted in the 
scientists cutting out the shape of a certain neuronal region pictured in a sketch with scissors 
rather than calculating its surface. They would then weigh the shape and, based on the weight of 
the clipping and the weight of the whole sheet of paper they could calculate the approximate 
surface of the area. AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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time (see Lynch 1986; cf. Abriszewski & Afeltowicz 2007). It is regrettable that 
Alač did not make Lynch’s book a reference point for her narration. 
A reading of Alač’s book as a supplementation or an update of science studies 
works already makes it worth the attention of people interested in STS. There 
is,  however,  a  third  reading,  as  a  result  of  which  Handling  Digital  Brains 
should be read also by social researchers from beyond STS. The book can be 
seen as a challenge to cognitive sciences. Let us begin with the fact that alt-
hough Alač does not state that as her aim, she de facto disenchants neurosci-
entific studies with the use of fMRI: she demonstrates the problematic aspect 
of the procedures of “gazing into the brain,” which evoke sensation in the 
popular culture and public discourse and are considered “a mirror of nature.” 
Not only does Alač reveal the areas of uncertainty and kludge-like methods of 
the researchers, the incredibly limited applicability of the used methods, lack 
of standardization and debates surrounding the techniques used, but, above 
all, she criticizes the specific understanding of embodiment in the fMRI exper-
iments. Let us elaborate on this issue. In the 1990s – described as the decade of 
the brain (Alač 2011: 5) – cognitive neuroscience, equipped with the new tech-
nologies of neuroimaging, became the dominant approach to studying human 
mind  and  cognition,  superseding  the  approaches  collectively  termed  cogni-
tivism, for which the analogy between a mind and a computer program was 
constitutive. The 1990s were also the decade during which the concepts of 
embodied cognition developed within cognitive science, assuming that in or-
der to comprehend cognition, it is necessary to account for the interactions 
between cognitive processes, the body and its environment (some approaches 
included also the social world and the material culture). Such an approach 
means that if we want to understand cognition and the mind, we should not 
study brains in dishes or write AI programs, but study biologically embedded 
minds. It should be emphasized that when writing about the body, the cogni-
tive  scientists  representing  this  approach  did  not  mean  solely  the  central 
nervous system. However, as Alač notes: 
The turn to embodiment, shaped by the availability and constraints of 
fMRI technology, presupposes an equation between the brain and the 
body; when talking about embodiment, cognitive neuroscientists refer 
to the brain (Alač 2011: 6). 
It is worth asking the question what precisely is being studied during an fMRI 
experiment?  The  body  of  the  subject  must  remain  immobile  (in  order  to 
achieve that, various devices are used, such as, for instance, a bite bar), and so 
we cannot study human mind while the body is moving, while taking part in 
multimodal social interactions: we can only study the subject’s reactions to 
imagined movement or pictures representing bodies in movement, or possibly 
pictures of other people and their behaviour, displayed on a screen inside the Good old-fashioned ethnography of laboratory 
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scanner. Generally, the conditions in the scanner make it difficult to study 
other modalities than the visual one. 
Due to such limitations and a trivial approach to embodiment, which charac-
terizes  neurocognitive  studies,  Alač  makes  us  wonder  how  neurocognitive 
studies could explain how neurocognitive scientists themselves solve research 
problems. Alač’s book demonstrates that researchers using the fMRI technolo-
gy during experiments and data interpretation solve problems by the means 
of actions radically different from those that are studied during experimental 
sessions in the scanner. When analyzing scans, they do not only look at the 
objects on the screen, but manipulate them, they do not work only on internal 
mental models, but also on a number of external representations, they utilize 
various material objects, including their own bodies, and, finally, they enter 
into rich, multimodal interactions with other researchers (see Alač 2011: 164). 
It can be said that ethnography of laboratory of cognitive neuroscience en-
forces a  significant change  in  approaching the method  of research, and  of 
framing mind and cognition. Alač’s book can be treated not as much a work 
on the subject of processes of communication or problem solving in a specific 
field of science, but, more generally, as a work on the subject of communica-
tion and problem solving by humans, no matter whether these problems are 
scientific,  technical,  bureaucratic,  literary,  or  related  to  engineering  or 
craftsmanship, etc. One can attempt to apply what Alač shows to many other 
human practices that involve working with digital visualizations displayed on 
screens  and  making  use  of  a  rich  spectrum  of  “semiotic  resources.”  This 
makes her work similar to Art and Artifact in Laboratory Science, in which 
Lynch does not deal with the practices of neurobiologists in order to say some-
thing about science, but, rather, he treats the laboratory and neurobiologists 
as any other workshop and craftsmen working therein. As Latour summed it 
up, Lynch could be just as well analyzing the practices of butchers, bankers, 
judges, social workers or grocers (Latour 1986: 542). The same thing pertains 
to Alač’s work. 
The  herein  described  challenge  to  the  cognitive  neuroscience  is  significant 
due to the fact that at present studies are entering the areas traditionally be-
longing to social researchers. When Alač was finishing her work on Handling 
Digital Brains, fMRI technique was beginning to be used in order to answer 
some questions in the field of social sciences. This was connected with the 
development of two research fields: social neuroscience and neuroeconomy, 
whose aim is to attempt to reduce the decision-making processes and social 
behaviours to neuronal processes. Handling Digital Brains appears at an ap-
propriate time, as it undermines the assumptions on which both aforemen-
tioned subfields of science are founded: the assumption that cognition is an 
internal process and the statement that embodiment comes down to the brain. AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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It is at this point that Alač’s book leaves the reader with a certain feeling of 
dissatisfaction: it does not open a front line between STS and neurocognitive 
studies. It does not offer a suggestion for approaching cognitive processes that 
would be extensive and alternative to the ideas of neuroscience as much as it 
refers to a certain set of positions and demonstrates time-consuming methods 
by the means of which one could study embodied, collective cognitive pro-
cesses. It is worth confronting Alač’s work with another of similar structure, 
that is Edwin Hutchins’ Cognition in the Wild (Hutchins 1995). He starts with 
an analysis of a specific set of cognitive practices – maritime navigation – to 
move on to formulate a new general conception of cognitive processes, com-
monly known as distributed cognition, and, thus, poses a challenge to almost 
the entirety of cognitive science of his times. We will not find traces of such 
ambitions on the 199 pages of Alač’s book. It seems that her analyses (con-
ducted partially in cooperation with Hutchins himself; see Alač & Hutchins 
2004) constitute a starting point for considerations that could result in an in-
teresting theoretical approach. However, that is a problematic objection, if the 
researcher herself does not hide her attachment to ethnomethodology: a re-
search approach that puts emphasis on detailed analyses of practices that are 
specific, situated, local, event-driven, that avoids any attempts at generaliza-
tion, questioning the possibility of saying something about science as such or 
society in general. 
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